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The 2015 refugee crisis added to the strain for the 
European integration project that is today beleaguered 
by Brexit and a decision on the future path of the EU. 
When the crisis hit, all member state governments had to 
take their domestic constituencies into consideration 
first. By consequence, the relations between older 
members and new members deteriorated, with 
increasing Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
resentments about the Commission’s proposals for 
relocation schemes for refugees and the favouring of a 
multi-speed Europe by older member states. Border 
controls were reinstated in several Schengen states, 
calling into question decades of solid integration in this 
area. Many CEE governments had also heavily carried the 
burden of the Ukraine crisis and had rather high ratios 
with respect to asylum applications per population. This 
situation was exacerbated by the fact that even before 
the arrival of a huge influx of Syrian refugees, EU states 
were already facing increasing migration from Western 
Balkan countries, where youth unemployment reaches 
up to 35-45 percent in Kosovo and Bosnia Herzegovina. 
This also added to the potential these countries could 
contribute to the number of European foreign fighters 
along ‘the so-called Islamic State’ (ISIS) lines. Another 
concern was the growing influence of Russia in the 
Western Balkans, especially in Serbia, Montenegro and 
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), 
which added to the perception that this region bears 
potential for both instability and direct confrontation 
with a significant external rival for Europe. All these 
factors do not contribute to a favourable public opinion 
in Western Europe about further European integration 
per se, let alone enlargement to the Western Balkans. 
This policy brief summarises the discussions held during 
the panel “NEAR or FEAR: The Security Aspect of EU 
Enlargement” organised by the College of Europe 
Development Office and the European Commission’s 
Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement 
Negotiations (DG NEAR) on 16 November 2016 in Bruges. 
This event was requested by the European Commission as 
a communication action in the area of EU Enlargement, in 
order to build a more informed public debate about the 
necessity to conduct a credible enlargement policy 
(European Commission, 2014). This is all the more 
important since the Juncker Commission has started its 
mandate by stating that there will be no further 
enlargement during the 2014-2020 term.  
The accession of the CEE countries to the EU was 
considered as their ‘return to Europe’. The enlargement 
policy was both a mission to that effect and the most 
successful foreign policy tool the EU ever possessed. 
However, its success quickly turned into an ‘enlargement 
Executive Summary 
 
> The EU’s enlargement towards the Western 
Balkans and Turkey would represent an 
enlargement towards a geographical zone 
neighbouring instability and insecurity. At the 
same time, the integration of these countries in 
the EU would represent the main solution to the 
security problems that emanate from this region. 
 
> Yet, at present, a major obstacle for the EU’s 
enlargement policy stems from within the Union. 
 
> This obstacle can be overcome: ‘enlargement’ 
can once again bring dynamism into the 
European integration process, if it is designed to 
become a solution to the problem of security 
through solidarity against terror and 
coordination on migration management. 
 
> To this effect, decision-makers in EU institutions 
and member states need to face the fear that the 
prospect of another enlargement often 
represents. Debates about enlargement should 
be upheld not only by EU policy-makers, but also 
by academia and civil society organisations. 
Enlargement concerns Europe’s common future, 
which needs to be built together. 
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fatigue’, and enlargement policy lost its attraction 
especially when it became merged with the EU’s 
neighbourhood policy within the Commission. This policy 
brief considers the reasons for the reluctance within the 
(especially Western) European public about further EU 
enlargement towards the Western Balkans and Turkey. It 
argues that such an enlargement would represent an 
enlargement towards a geographical zone neighbouring 
instability and insecurity, and discusses how the EU’s 
policy of ambivalence deteriorates the situation on the 
ground. It shows that the inclusion of these countries in 
the EU is in reality the solution to the security problems 
that emanate from this region.  
The security situation in enlargement countries 
The recovery of the Western Balkans from the dissolution 
of Yugoslavia has been a difficult process for all countries 
of the region. Turkey is the longest standing candidate that 
started its accession process in 1999, alongside half of the 
2004/2007 enlargement countries. These countries have 
their own internal and external problems that significantly 
impact their economic, social and political conditions. Two 
major developments, however, have worsened their 
situation: the Western Balkan migration route and the 
emergence of ISIS. Each will be analysed below.  
Migration, social instabilities and political problems  
The first problem that these countries encounter is the 
growing social instability. The emergence of the Balkan 
migratory route in summer 2015 and its subsequent 
closure have left thousands of migrants stuck en route. As 
the Director-General of the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) William Lacy Swing repeatedly 
underlines: ‘Migration is not a problem to be solved; it is a 
reality to be managed’(UN Regional Information Centre 
for Western Europe, 2015). Even though some financial 
remedies are provided to field workers, to tackle the many 
needs of the migrants, more than responding to basic 
human needs is at stake. Many migrants resort to using 
migrant smugglers in the absence of an option to travel in 
a regular manner. A comprehensive review of migrant 
smuggling networks published by Europol and INTERPOL 
(2016) estimates that the annual turnover of migrant 
smuggling was worth an estimated USD 5-6 billion in 2015, 
representing one of the main profit-generating activities 
for organised criminals in Europe. The report highlights 
that facilitators behind migrant smuggling are organized in 
loosely connected networks, and that migrant smuggling 
is a multinational business. Suspects originate from over 
100 countries. 
The elevation of standards on border security by the 
candidate countries has proved vital for dealing with the 
migration crisis and fight against networks of human 
smuggling. First, the EU asked Turkey to act as a 
gatekeeper of migration flows to Europe ever since the 
Accession Partnership of 2001. In 2003, Turkey was 
requested to sign a readmission agreement. However, it 
took over a decade for Turkey to agree on the signing of 
such an agreement. In 2013, the country went through a 
ground-breaking reform, revamping its migration and 
asylum system, establishing the Directorate-General of 
Migration Management with 3000 new expert staff. In 
December of that year, Turkey signed a readmission 
agreement with the EU. Visa-free travel arrangements in 
the Schengen area for Turkish citizens was the only quid 
pro quo. This visa-exemption process is now on hold due 
to the political tensions over the counter-terrorism laws in 
Turkey. Without the conclusion of the visa-exemption 
regime, the Turkish government has no incentives for 
upholding the readmission agreement, which could also 
jeopardise the refugee deal of March 2016. In fact, as early 
as September 2016 the Turkish EU Minister warned that 
Turkey would not implement a readmission agreement 
with the EU meant to stem the flow of illegal migrants if it 
did not obtain the visa-free travel to Europe it had been 
promised.  
Second, the Western Balkan countries are heavily 
dependent on EU aid for managing the daily needs of the 
stranded refugees on their territories awaiting decisions 
on their future. According to Frontex, the so-called 
Western Balkan route became a popular passageway into 
the EU in 2012, when Schengen visa restrictions were 
relaxed for five Balkan countries. In 2013, nearly all of the 
20,000 people applied for asylum after crossing the 
Hungarian border illegally. Migrant flows from Greece 
followed. Part of the reason for the dramatic rise in the 
overall numbers in 2014 was irregular migration by 
nationals of the region, especially from Kosovo, who 
joined the northward march by Syrians and Somalis. The 
record number of migrants arriving in Greece had a direct 
effect on the Western Balkan route, as the people who 
entered the EU in Greece tried to make their way via 
FYROM and Serbia into Hungary and Croatia and then 
towards Western Europe. In all of 2015, the region 
recorded 764,000 detections of illegal border crossings by 
migrants, a 16-fold rise from 2014 (Frontex, 2016).  
Foreign fighters and border security  
The second problem linked with border security is the rise 
of ISIS in the Middle East, and its attraction to many 
‘foreign fighters’ in both Western Europe and the Balkans. 
The fairly porous and long border between the countries 
of the enlargement region and Syria has made it possible 
for foreign fighters to travel along this region to fight in the 
Syrian war. From 2011 until the end of 2016, close to 
40,000 people from 128 different countries have been 
banned from entering Turkey. An additional 3000 from 95 
different countries have been deported. The Western 
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Balkan countries also need to upgrade their border 
controls to prevent such travels through the region. This 
has become an important part of their accession process.  
A report from the EU’s Institute for Security Studies 
(Petrovic, 2016) states that Balkan countries are among 
Europe’s top exporters of volunteer fighter for radical 
Islamic groups, even if Islamic traditions in the Balkans had 
never had extremist tendencies. Conflicts in Bosnia, 
Kosovo and FYROM resulted in the arrival of Salafist 
foreign fighters, which remained after the conflicts were 
‘resolved’. The poor economic conditions and the lacking 
employment prospects in these countries also feed into 
extremism in the region. The report also states that due to 
their NATO and EU accession aspirations, Balkan countries 
work to comply with UN resolution 2178 to combat 
terrorism, including the financing of terrorist activity. They 
adapted their laws, making it illegal to participate in or 
organise travel to war zones. 
These points illustrate how responding responsibly to 
refugee flows and control of borders becomes a single, 
complex and intertwined issue. As the importance of 
border controls in the EU’s vicinity gain precedence, the 
only way the neighbouring countries will be incentivised to 
implement EU-compatible controls is by joining the Union. 
Without the prospect of membership, they risk becoming 
the ‘dumping grounds’ for unwanted refugees, having to 
deal with all security implications on their own. 
The Lack of European Enthusiasm 
Despite all these problems in and around the candidate 
countries, the major obstacles for the EU’s enlargement 
policy seems to stem from within the Union. EU 
institutions do not have political ownership of the process 
any more, and member states see the topic as one of 
political controversy for opposing further enlargement, 
thus in effect helping Euro-sceptic and xenophobic 
rhetoric to gain ground. When combined, the results of 
these two trends do not allow much space for a future 
enlargement policy. 
The increasing power of national prerogatives 
The 2004-2007 accessions resulted in a general 
enlargement fatigue, among both EU leaders and national 
politicians. Today, when enlargement manages to make it 
to the agenda of any political debate, the national 
prerogatives of each member state for further 
enlargement hinder the emergence of an EU-wide 
assessment of enlargement policies. Most of the current 
candidates are involved in a political dispute with at least 
one member state, who threatens to veto further 
advancement of that candidate further down the path of 
negotiations. Even member states that do not have a 
dispute with a particular candidate country promised their 
publics referenda prior to further EU enlargement. In 
doing so, they claim to establish ‘national safeguards and 
mechanisms’ to control the process of further 
enlargement (Balfour & Stratulat, 2015). This results in the 
‘nationalisation’ of the enlargement process (Hillion, 
2010), an originally ‘European’ policy area. When the 
European Commission attempts to keep the process intact 
despite national hindrances, the sentiment it creates in 
member states is that it tries to override national 
concerns. Such an attitude by member states creates even 
more populistic and nationalistic rhetoric against Brussels, 
and undermines the potential for a credible enlargement 
policy pursued by the EU institutions. 
The decreasing power of European institutions 
The described lack of European enthusiasm depicted as 
enlargement fatigue created in turn what has been called 
‘accession fatigue’ among candidate countries (Vilyanova, 
2016). The lacking belief that they will become EU 
members in any foreseeable future makes these countries 
perceive any efforts for approximation with the EU as 
‘unworthy’.  
This accession fatigue was intensified by the Juncker 
Commission’s proclamation that there would not be a new 
round of EU enlargement during its term of office. The 
Commission’s lack of commitment led to individual 
member states gaining political control of the process. 
Even though the problems encountered by candidate 
countries would have made imminent enlargement rather 
improbable anyway, the early announcement of this halt 
to the EU’s widening at the stage of portfolio distribution 
has left the European Commission without an assertive 
role in the enlargement process. This also resulted in an 
erosion of its role as the driver of the EU’s enlargement 
policy (Hillion, 2015). Despite the Commission’s efforts to 
make the evaluations of candidate countries more 
transparent and understandable, the technicalities of the 
process are actually adding to the accession fatigue among 
both the publics and politicians of the candidate countries.   
While securing the political careers of some European 
leaders, the remarks about who should be allowed into the 
EU and by when created a tectonic shift in enlargement 
countries. Candidate country governments have no 
incentives to apply ‘European standards’ of border 
security, since this would only further alienate their 
national and regional backgrounds. As a result, 
enlargement loses its credibility both as a tool of EU’s 
foreign policy towards its immediate European vicinity and 
as an ongoing aim of European integration. The move of 
European leaders to close the enlargement debate for 
some time in 2014 thus provided for an unhealthy 
discourse. Acting responsibly and elevating the credibility 
of the decision-making process for admitting new 
members could help build a better political environment. 
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Conclusions and policy recommendations 
In the current context, the European Commission is 
signalling renewed attention and commitment towards 
the Western Balkan countries. This should be supported 
by academia, artists, and civil society organisations to 
uphold the European project on a wider scale. Some 
concrete steps could support this process. First, 
enlargement should become an individual policy area 
again, separate from the European Neighbourhood Policy. 
Second, considerable energy should be devoted to 
including widening and ‘enlargement policy’ in debates on 
the future of Europe (Drajij & Rudan, 2017). EU institutions 
and decision-makers need to actively face the fear that the 
next enlargement presents. Avoidance does not make 
problems disappear. Third, it should be remembered that 
political decision-makers themselves construct agendas 
and the dominant rhetoric. Just as Euro-sceptics make 
their case, pro-integration circles should also speak up, 
both in the member states and in the candidate countries. 
A new rhetoric embodying a mission for a better common 
future involving the EU and the candidate countries may 
be in order. Last, but not least, Europe should continue to 
be a project that unites and does not discriminate. In times 
as these, more Europe for more people, and not less 
Europe for less people, is the solution. If designed to 
become a solution to the problem of security via solidarity 
against terror and joint migration management, 
‘enlargement’ can once again become the policy area 
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